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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On June 3, 2005, 46 year 
old RCMP Constable 
J.M.J. (Jean) Minguy 
went overboard from an 
RCMP patrol vessel. On 
June 5, 2005 a remote 
operating vehicle located 
Constable Minguy’s body.  
 
Constable Minguy was a 23 year veteran of the 
RCMP. He had been posted in North Vancouver, 
Tofino and lastly in Vernon for the past nine 
years. Constable Minguy leaves 
behind an estranged wife and 
two sons, aged 13 and 11. He is 
survived by his mother and two 
sisters who reside in the 
Province of Quebec.  
 
On July 4, 2005, 45 year old RCMP Constable 
Jose Agostinho was killed in Millet, Alberta and 
another officer was injured after a parked 
cruiser was rammed by a truck on a flat, straight 
section of a main highway south of Edmonton. 
 
Constable Agostinho was posted to Wetaskiwin, 
Alberta at the time of his death 
and had also served in the 
Canadian Armed Forces. He was 
a nine year veteran of the RCMP 
and is survived by his wife and 
two children. 
 
On July 20, 2005, 29 year old OPP Constable 
Andrew J. Potts and another officer responded 
to a domestic dispute shortly after 2:00 a.m. 
The two officers were driving in a marked OPP 
 
 
cruiser when they were involved in a collision 
with a moose crossing the roadway. After 
striking the animal, the cruiser came to rest in 
the ditch. The weather was foggy and the moose 
was on the roadway at the time of the collision. 
 
Constable Potts, who was driving the cruiser, was 
pronounced deceased at the scene. The second 
officer was transported by ambulance to 
hospital and later airlifted with serious injuries 
to Toronto. 
 
Constable Potts, was a seven-year veteran with 
the OPP. He was initially posted to Pickle Lake 
Detachment in Northwestern 
Ontario and then returned 
home to Muskoka and 
Bracebridge Detachment. He 
is survived by his parents, 
sister and girlfriend 
 
With the deaths of these three officers, a total 
of seven peace officers have died in the line of 
duty in 2005. This year’s total equals the number 
of officers who died in all of 2004. The other 
officers to lose their lives in 2005 are:  
 
RCMP Constable Anthony Gordon  
 
RCMP Constable Lionide (Leo) Johnston  
 
RCMP Constable Brock Myrol 
 
RCMP Constable Peter Schiemann 
 
“They are our heroes, 
We shall not forget them” 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“Would you please add me 
to your electronic 
distribution of ‘In 
Service: 10-8’. I usually 
pick up your newsletter 
from our Training Section, but I would prefer 
receiving it by e-mail, so I do not miss it. I have 
been reading it for the past 4 years; it is a 
great contribution to our knowledge base. 
However, I must admit that I find reading 
[some] inane decisions… thoroughly 
depressing!”—Police Sergeant, British Columbia  
************ 
“Just thought I would drop you a quick note of 
appreciation for all the work you do with this 
newsletter.  I am a Training Officer in my 
department of 600 officers, and we use your 
newsletter ALL THE TIME.  You have done (and 
continue to do) a wonderful job of keeping your 
fellow officers updated with the latest from 
the courts (no small task!).”—Training Officer, 
Ontario 
************ 
“Thanks for [the newsletter]...although I am no 
longer in Training, I appreciate this info as a 
Patrol Sergeant”—Police Sergeant, Ontario 
************ 
“Great Newsletter! Good info & an easy read, I 
really enjoy them. THANX!”—Police Constable, 
Ontario 
************ 
“I have recently started my career in policing 
and have quickly become aware that, in 
this profession, it is vitally important to 
continue to learn and to stay abreast of case law 
and current events. I enjoy reading your 
newsletter and find it a helpful resource.”—
Police Constable, British Columbia    
 
Note-able Quote 
 
It’s not the mountain we conquer, but 
ourselves—Sir Edmund Hillary   
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All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online 
by clicking on the Police 
Academy link at:  
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
 
ID REQUEST NOT AN 
UNLAWFUL SEARCH 
R. v. Williams,  
[2005] O.J. No. 1887 (OCJ) 
 
A police officer approached a 
suspicious vehicle parked on park 
property. The officer was part 
of a team of officers routinely 
patrolling public parks at night in 
response to many complaints of drug and alcohol 
activity. The officer asked the accused, one of 
four occupants, what he was doing in the park at 
that time and why he was parked facing 
outwards from the curb. The accused said they 
were “hanging out”. The officer asked for 
identification and ran the subjects for warrants 
and other information.  
 
The officer learned the accused had 
misidentified himself and was bound by an 
undertaking which he was breaching—a non-
association condition. The accused was arrested 
and searched and charged with possession of a 
controlled substance and breach of undertaking.  
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused argued his rights under s.10(b) of the 
Charter had been violated. He submitted that he 
was detained before his identification was 
requested and he felt compelled to produce it; 
therefore the officer should have advised him of 
his right to counsel.  Since he was not informed 
of his right to a lawyer, he contended the 
request for identification was an unlawful search 
and the evidence should be excluded. 
 
Justice Halikowski disagreed. In his view there 
were no Charter breaches. He stated: 
 
…this Court finds that the officer was acting 
within the general scope of his duties and his 
requesting identification of the parties within 
the vehicle did not constitute a detention 
within the meaning of the Charter and 
therefore no rights to counsel were necessary 
to be given. Further, this court does not find 
that the request for identification in any way 
constituted an unlawful or warrantless search 
within the context of this investigation by this 
officer. At its highest the contact between 
this officer and the accused was in fulfilment 
of the officer's duty to prevent crime and 
apprehend wrong-doers and the accused's duty 
as a citizen to accept a minimal intrusion on his 
liberty. He was at liberty at any time to refuse 
to cooperate with the officer but he chose not 
to do so. [para. 7] 
 
The accused’s Charter application failed. 
 
ROADSIDE SCREENING 
MEASURES PERMISSIBLE 
WITHOUT A LAWYER  
R. v. Orbanski & R. v. Elias,  
2005 SCC 37 
 
In two consolidated cases, the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
overturned two Manitoba Court 
of Appeal and ruled there is no 
need for a motorist to be advised of their right 
to counsel before undertaking roadside 
screening measures, such as asking about recent 
alcohol consumption or participating in sobriety 
tests.  
 
Facts & History: R. v. Orbanski 
 
The accused was stopped by police after he ran 
a stop sign, made a wide turn and swerved back 
and forth on the road. After detecting an odour 
of liquor on the accused’s breath and observing 
that his eyes were glassy, the police officer 
asked him if he had been drinking. He admitted 
to having one beer and was asked to perform 
voluntary field sobriety tests—reciting the 
alphabet, walking heel to toe while counting to 
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10, and following the officer’s finger with his 
eyes. The accused failed the tests and he was 
arrested, fully advised of his right to counsel, 
and read the breath demand. After speaking to a 
lawyer he provided samples above the legal limit 
and he was charged with impaired driving and 
over 80mg%. 
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court the 
accused was acquitted. In the trial judge’s view 
the sobriety tests were authorized by the 
common law—although the accused was not 
bound to perform them. However, he was not 
properly informed of his right to counsel prior to 
the tests being administered. Without the 
results of the sobriety tests, the officer would 
not have had reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the accused nor make a demand for 
breath samples under the Criminal Code.  The 
trial judge excluded the sobriety tests and 
breathalyzer readings under s.24(2) of the 
Charter and the charges were dismissed.  
 
On appeal by Crown to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal a new trial was ordered. Justice Philp, 
authoring the appeal court’s judgment, ruled 
there was no common law or statutory authority 
to request the sobriety tests nor was there a 
limit on the right to counsel under s.1 of the 
Charter. However, Justice Philp disagreed with 
the trial judge on the admissibility of the 
evidence. In his opinion, the evidence should have 
been admitted under s.24(2). 
 
Facts & History: R. v. Elias 
 
The accused was randomly stopped by police 
after he was seen enter a pickup truck and leave 
a hotel. The officer detected an odour of liquor 
and asked the accused if he had been drinking. 
The accused responded, “yes” and the officer 
read a demand for a roadside breath sample into 
an approved screening device. The accused failed 
and was arrested for impaired driving, informed 
of his rights regarding counsel, and given the 
breathalyzer demand. He subsequently provided 
breathalyzer samples over the legal limit and he 
was charged with impaired driving and over 
80mg%.  
 
At trial in Manitoba Provincial Court, the judge 
found the accused’s rights under s.10(b) of the 
Charter had been violated because he was not 
advised of his right to counsel before the 
officer asked him if he had been drinking. The 
judge excluded the results of the roadside test 
under s.24(2); therefore there was no basis for 
the breathalyzer demand. He was acquitted on 
all charges. 
 
On appeal, the Manitoba Court of Queen’s bench 
set aside the over 80mg% acquittal and ordered 
a new trial. In the appeal judge’s opinion the 
officer did not have to advise the accused of his 
right to counsel before asking him about 
whether he had been drinking. On further appeal 
to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, a majority 
concluded that asking the accused about recent 
drinking without first advising him about the 
right to a lawyer breached s.10(b) of the 
Charter and could not be saved by s.1. However, 
once again, Manitoba’s high court admitted the 
evidence of the roadside screening and 
breathalyzer tests under s.24(2).  
 
The Supreme Court Weighs In 
 
Both of these cases made their way before the 
Supreme Court of Canada in which the Crown 
made several concessions: 
 
1. both accused were detained for constitutional 
purposes from the moment they were 
directed to pull over thereby triggering the 
right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter 
(para.31); 
 
2. neither accused was afforded their right to 
counsel until they were arrested (para. 32); 
 
3. the evidence obtained without the right to 
counsel could only be used as an investigative 
tool to confirm or reject the officer’s 
suspicion of impairment and provide grounds 
for a demand, but could not be used as direct 
evidence at trial to incriminate the driver 
(para. 58);  
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4. Manitoba statute relevant at the time did not 
expressly limit the right to counsel (para. 69); 
and 
 
5. drivers are under no obligation to perform 
sobriety tests or to answer questions about 
consumption (para. 82).  
 
Justice Charron authored the majority Supreme 
Court judgment. He made several important 
observations concerning the context of these 
stops: 
 
• these cases were concerned with the licensed 
and regulated activity of driving on a highway, 
rather than liberty in a general sense; 
 
• drinking drivers are a menace and effective 
screening can only be achieved through 
enforcement by police officers in the field; 
 
• police must be able to screen drivers at a 
road stop before they are involved in an 
accident; 
 
• effective screening at the roadside ensures 
the safety of the driver being screened along 
with their passengers and other highway 
users; 
 
• the need for regulation and control involves 
both federal and provincial legislation—the 
federal legislation concerned with deterring 
and punishing criminal offences while 
provincial legislation allows for action even if 
the danger presented does not reach the 
criminal level, such as immediate driving 
licence suspensions; and 
 
• these cases deal with the interaction between 
police officers and motorists during a 
roadside screening procedure from when they 
are stopped by police to when they are either 
arrested or allowed to continue of their way. 
 
The right to counsel under s.10(b) of the 
Charter is triggered on arrest or detention, 
however it is not absolute. It may be suspended 
under s.1 of the Charter if there is a reasonable 
limit placed on it that is 1) prescribed by law and 
2) can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. Even though a detained 
driver does not have to answer questions about 
alcohol consumption nor perform sobriety tests 
on police request, both of these procedures are 
prescribed by law and arise through necessary 
implication from the operating requirements of 
federal and provincial legislation. 
 
Police in Manitoba, as in most provinces, have the 
statutory right to stop motorists for highway 
safety reasons—checking driver’s licences and 
insurance, sobriety, and vehicle fitness—under 
the general power found in s.76.1 of the Highway 
Traffic Act or under the common law authority 
to check driver sobriety. Since the police had 
the power and the duty to check both accused’s 
sobriety in these cases, measures could be taken 
by police to fulfill their duty, even though there 
were no explicit provisions authorizing the 
investigative measures undertaken. The Supreme 
Court ruled the screening measures of asking 
about alcohol consumption and performing 
sobriety tests were reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances and implicit under 
general stop provisions.  
 
The limit on the right to counsel in these 
circumstances was also reasonable. Using the 
same rationale advanced in roadside screening 
device cases—where the right to counsel may be 
suspended before administering the test—
Justice Charron found the sobriety tests and 
questions in these cases were the functional 
equivalent of a roadside screening device. Thus 
the limit on the accused’s s.10(b) rights were 
prescribed by law, which was also justified given 
the importance of detecting and deterring 
impaired drivers, the regulated nature of 
driving, the limits imposed on the types of 
screening (must be reasonably necessary) and 
the limited use of the evidence (for reasonable 
and probable grounds only). 
 
As a result, Orbanski’s appeal was dismissed 
while the Crown’s appeal in Elias was granted. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
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‘FORTHWITH’ REQUIRES A 
PROMPT DEMAND 
R. v. Woods, 2005 SCC 42 
 
The accused was stopped by 
police and a strong odour of 
liquor was detected. After 
demanding a roadside breath 
sample into an approved screening device (ASD) 
under s.254(2) of the Criminal Code, which the 
accused refused, he was arrested for failing to 
comply with the demand and was informed of his 
rights. The accused said he wanted to speak with 
a lawyer but was told he would have to wait until 
at the office, since there was no cell phone 
available in the police car.  
 
The officer waited for a tow truck which caused 
a delay in arriving at the police station, more 
than an hour after the arrest. After speaking 
with a lawyer, the accused then told the officer 
he wished to provide a sample. The ASD demand 
was read again and after seven attempts the 
accused failed. He was then arrested for 
impaired driving, given a breathalyser demand, 
and re-advised of his right to counsel. He again 
spoke with a lawyer, subsequently provided two 
breath samples—both 120mg%—and was charged 
with driving over 80mg% and impaired driving. 
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of driving over 80 mg% 
and a stay of proceedings was entered for the 
impaired driving. The trial judge found that the 
ASD sample had been taken “forthwith”—as 
s.254(2) of the Criminal Code requires—because 
the refusal was continuous from the time he was 
stopped until one hour and 10 minutes later when 
he changed his mind at the police station.  Thus, 
in the trial judge’s opinion, the sample provided 
was in response to the demand made at the 
roadside1.  
 
On appeal to the Manitoba Court of Queen’s 
Bench, the appeal justice concluded the 
                                                 
1 see R. v. Woods, 2004 MBCA 46 
accused’s rights under s.8 of the Charter had 
been breached. In the appeal justice’s view, the 
breath sample ultimately provided was in 
response to the demand made at the police 
station—not the one made at the roadside—and 
went well beyond that contemplated by the 
meaning of “forthwith”. Consequently, a verdict 
of acquittal was entered. The Crown then 
appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal2. 
 
Justice Philp, writing for the unanimous 
Manitoba Court of Appeal found s.254(2) of the 
Criminal Code provides for the testing of the 
presence of alcohol in a vehicle operator’s breath 
provided a peace officer reasonably suspects 
they have alcohol in their body. Under this 
section, a peace officer may make a demand 
requiring the person forthwith provide a sample 
of their breath into an ASD—“a screening test 
to be administered immediately and with minimal 
inconvenience to drivers...”  
 
Since the accused provided the sample more 
than one hour after the stop—not with the 
promptitude and immediacy required under the 
section—it could not be said the sample was 
taken forthwith. Rather, the ASD sample 
provided at the police station was a consequence 
of the invalid second demand. This fail reading at 
the police station, therefore, could not be relied 
upon as part of the reasonable and probable 
grounds required for a breathalyzer demand. 
The breathalyzer analysis evidencing the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood 
was inadmissible and the Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. Justice Philp noted, however, that 
there was no apparent reason why the accused 
could not have been prosecuted for the initial 
roadside refusal3. 
 
The Crown launched one further appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the court 
ignore the second demand made at the police 
station and interpret the phrase “to provide 
forthwith” found in the ASD demand section 
                                                 
2 see footnote 1. 
3 see footnote 1. 
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broad enough to encompass the circumstances 
of this case.  
 
Justice Fish, authoring the unanimous Supreme 
Court judgment, rejected the Crown’s appeal, 
holding that the breath sample was not provided 
“forthwith”. In reaching his conclusion, Justice 
Fish first noted that there are two methods for 
obtaining a legal ASD breath sample: 
 
1. voluntarily (which Crown conceded was not 
the case); or 
 
2. pursuant to a valid demand under s.254(2) of 
the Criminal Code. Under this subsection, the 
police can require a person forthwith provide 
a sample of their breath into an ASD if an 
officer reasonably suspects the person 
operating or in care or control of a motor 
vehicle has alcohol in their body. 
 
An ASD demand is the first of “a two-step 
detection and enforcement procedure to curb 
impaired driving.” An ASD provides for 
immediate roadside screening upon interception 
of a motorist and helps determine the presence 
of alcohol and whether more conclusive testing 
is warranted. At this stage, limits are placed on 
a drivers constitutional guarantees, such as the 
right to counsel. The second step, a 
breathalyzer demand, allows for breathalyzer 
testing which is regularly conducted at the 
police station. These results determine the 
alcohol concentration in a driver’s blood. At this 
stage, Charter rights must be respected and 
enforced, such as the right to counsel.  
 
In this case, the police made two ASD demands 
under s.254(2); one at the roadside and the 
other at the police station some time after the 
stop. The second demand made at the station 
was not lawful and, as Crown urged, should be 
ignored for the purposes of resolving the 
appeal. This left Crown contending that the 
ASD sample obtained at the police station was a 
product of the ASD demand at the roadside 
even though “compliance” was achieved more 
than one hour later.  
Justice Fish, however, dismissed this long-delay 
compliance argument and ruled that the delay 
occurring from the first ASD demand to the 
taking of the ASD sample fell outside the ambit 
of “forthwith”, which means immediately or 
without delay (although there may be a 
somewhat flexible interpretation, such as brief 
and unavoidable delays). “The ‘forthwith’ 
requirement in s. 254(2) appears to me…to 
connote a prompt demand by the peace officer, 
and an immediate response by the person to 
whom that demand is addressed,” said Justice 
Fish. “To accept as compliance ‘forthwith’ the 
furnishing of a breath sample more than an hour 
after being arrested for having failed to comply 
is in my view a semantic stretch beyond literal 
bounds and constitutional limits.” 
 
Here, the accused did not provide a breath 
sample in response to the first demand at the 
roadside. The evidence was clear that he 
expressly refused at the roadside and was 
arrested for failing to comply. The ASD sample 
was furnished after the second demand, which 
was invalid since it was not made forthwith. It 
was the police who later decided not to 
prosecute the accused for the refusal after he 
had provided the evidence to support an over 
80mg% charge. As Justice Fish noted, “drivers 
upon whom ASD demands are made are bound by 
s.254(2) to comply immediately—and not later, 
at a time of their choosing, when they have 
decided to stop refusing!” 
 
The breathalyzer demand and subsequent 
breathalyzer tests performed at the police 
station depended on whether the police had 
reasonable and probable grounds to make such a 
demand. The only evidence or such a demand 
was the ASD result obtained at the police 
station. Since the ASD sample provided by the 
accused at the police station was not obtained 
lawfully—forthwith in response to a proper 
demand—the breathalyzer results were 
inadmissible.  The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
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TYPE OF PHOTO-LINEUP USED 
GOES TO EVIDENTIARY 
WEIGHT 
R. v. Grant, 2005 ABCA 222 
 
The accused appealed his 
conviction for armed robbery 
arguing, in part, that the photo 
lineup used by police to identify 
him as the robber was tainted because the police 
failed to comply with the recommendations of 
the Sophonow Report (2001). In the Sophonow 
Report, the commissioner recommended that a 
photo pack contain 10 subjects to be shown to a 
witness by an officer other than the investigator 
and the photos be presented sequentially 
(individually one at a time). In this case, the 
photo pack contained 8 subjects selected and 
administered by the investigator as a package, 
rather than sequentially. The trial judge, 
however, noted that the officer did not aid any 
witnesses in their choice and had instructed the 
witnesses that the robber may or may not be 
found in the photos.  
 
In rejecting the accused’s appeal, Justice 
Fruman, for the Alberta Court of Appeal, cited 
an Ontario Court of Appeal decision that 
described the Sophonow recommendations as 
“persuasive tools”.  In Justice Fruman’s view, 
there “are no rigid rules respecting the weight 
to be placed on this evidence.” The trial judge 
did not err in giving the photo lineup some 
weight. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
NO PRIVACY IN SISTER’s CELL 
PHONE RECORDS 
R. v. Pervez, 2005 ABCA 175 
 
The accused was implicated in the 
murder of a man suspected of 
being involved in his brother’s 
murder. At trial, the Crown 
theorized that the accused hired his co-accused 
to commit the murder and actively directed him. 
The police obtained a search warrant for phone 
records, including a cell phone to which the 
accused’s sister was a subscriber, but the trial 
judge found a facial defect and ruled the 
warrant invalid; therefore the search was 
warrantless. Nonetheless, the phone records 
were admitted at the trial.  
 
Three types of records related to the cell phone 
were introduced. These records are kept by cell 
phone service providers enabling them to track 
calls and bill for service charges and roaming 
fees: 
 
1. subscriber information that revealed the 
name and address of the phone subscriber; 
 
2. call detail records that revealed the calls 
received or made by a particular cell phone 
along with the time of the call and duration; 
 
3. cell tower information that revealed the 
general location of the cell phone at the time 
of the call. 
 
The sister’s cell phone records showed extensive 
communication with the co-accused’s phone 
leading up to and immediately before the 
murder, but no contact during or after the 
murder. As well, the accused’s sister’s cell phone 
could be placed in an area nearby the murder 
scene. The accused suggested he had a privacy 
interest in the phone because he made extensive 
use of the phone, made payment when the bill 
was in arrears, and gave the number of the 
phone out to his employee and a business 
manager at a car dealership. The accused was 
convicted, but appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in 
determining that he did not have a privacy 
interest in the phone records related to his 
sister’s telephone.  
 
The accused had argued at trial that he had a 
privacy interest in the cell phone records 
because they revealed a biological core of 
information revealing intimate details about his 
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lifestyle and personal choices, the substance of 
what s.8 of the Charter protects. He suggested 
the intimate details revealed the following: 
 
• established a link between himself and his co-
accused; 
 
• demonstrated the extent of their 
communication preceding the murder and a 
temporal nexus to the murder; 
 
• placed the accused within a geographical area 
at a time relative to the murder; 
 
• demonstrated movement by the accused 
toward or away from the murder scene; 
 
• showed that there were no incoming or 
outgoing calls at the time of the murder; 
 
• demonstrated the phone contact between the 
accused and his co-accused; 
 
• assisted in obtaining a search warrant; and 
 
• corroborated the testimony of two Crown 
witnesses. 
 
Justice Ritter, authoring the unanimous Alberta 
Court of Appeal judgment, rejected the 
accused’s submission. In her view, the trial judge 
did not err in concluding the accused had no 
privacy interest in his sister’s cell phone records. 
She held: 
 
The records do not reveal intimate details of 
[accused’s] lifestyle or personal choices. They 
merely show that a cell phone he used was in a 
certain place at a certain time and facilitated 
contact with another cell phone. The records 
only acquire significance when they are 
considered alongside the remaining evidence. 
The inferences provided by the records 
confirm the evidence of various witnesses…. 
 
Furthermore, the records were created as 
part of a commercial relationship between the 
cell phone service provider and [the accused’s 
sister]. There was no evidence that the service 
provider was bound to keep the records 
confidential. [The accused] argues that his use 
of the cell phone generated the records, thus 
creating a privacy interest. However, any 
expectation of privacy on the part of [the 
accused] is vitiated by the fact that the 
records of his use were provided to his sister 
on a regular basis through billing statements. 
One measure of an individual’s privacy interest 
is whether that the person can assert any 
control over the records. [The accused] was 
not able to do so. If, for example, he had 
contacted the service provider to demand 
copies of the records, the provider could have 
refused and [the accused] would have had no 
recourse. It is doubtful that [the accused] 
even knew of the existence of some of the 
information. It was created for legitimate 
commercial purposes. It was subject to a 
commercial contract, to which [the accused] 
was not a party. 
 
Persons who want to maintain privacy rights 
have, at a minimum, to structure their affairs 
in a manner consistent with that desire. Using 
a cell phone that is owned by another party 
does not entitle the user to a privacy interest 
over records that are relevant to the 
relationship between the cell phone provider 
and the owner of the cell phone. [paras. 12-14]  
 
The accused could not establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the records and he 
therefore had no standing to advance a s.8 
Charter violation. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
OFFICER’S GROUNDS 
OBJECTIVELY SUPPORTED: 
DETENTION NOT ARBITRARY 
R. v. Tsai,  
(2005) Docket:C39249 (OntCA) 
 
Police obtained an authorization 
to intercept telephone 
communications of a man who, 
along with his associates, were 
involved in stealing drugs using violence.  
Investigators learned that an Asian male, known 
as “Sean” who drove a white Infiniti, had 80 
pounds of marihuana and would be the target of 
a robbery after arranging to meet for a drug 
deal. During one of the intercepted calls, police 
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learned that Sean would meet a grey Cavalier 
that afternoon at a Dunkin’ Donuts shop near the 
airport. Hoping to intercept Sean before the 
robbery happened; police arrived and observed a 
man drive into the parking lot in a white Infiniti 
followed by a grey Cavalier.  
 
After parking his car and getting out, the 
accused was arrested for possession of a 
controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking. Nothing was found during a search 
of his person but police could see a shrink-
wrapped package of marihuana under the driver’s 
seat. The car was searched and police found two 
garbage bags of marihuana and two cell phones in 
the trunk, as well as the shrink wrapped package 
of marihuana under the driver’ seat. At trial, the 
judge was satisfied that the officer had 
reasonable grounds that a drug transaction was 
about to occur; the arrest and search was 
therefore lawful. The accused was convicted and 
sentenced to 22 months imprisonment. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that he was arbitrarily 
detained contrary to s.9 of the Charter. 
Although the accused conceded that the officer 
subjectively believed he had reasonable grounds 
to arrest, he submitted there were no objective 
grounds. In his view, the police required 
reasonable grounds there was marihuana in the 
car and that the accused was the “Sean” 
mentioned in the wiretaps. 
 
The Court rejected this ground of appeal, 
agreeing with the trial judge that the police had 
the necessary grounds to justify the arrest: 
 
In response to the [accused’s] submission that 
the police would only have had objective 
grounds to arrest if, on the balance of 
probabilities, they knew he had the drugs in 
his possession, we make two comments.  First, 
objective grounds to arrest exist if a crime is 
about to occur and the trial judge found a drug 
transaction “was about to take place”.  Second, 
the intercepted communications combined with 
the officers’ observations did provide [him] 
with objective grounds from which to infer, on 
a balance of probabilities, that the [accused] 
had drugs in his possession. 
 
With respect to whether the person arrested 
was the person named Sean in the wiretaps, 
[the officer] knew they were looking for an 
Asian male who wore glasses and who would be 
driving a white Infiniti in the Dunkin’ Donuts 
parking lot.  [The officer] also knew that Sean 
would be meeting a person driving a gray 
Cavalier and the officer observed a gray 
Cavalier in the parking lot of the donut shop.  
The trial judge found that, “The [accused] fit 
all of these descriptors and nothing about him 
was inconsistent with the information the 
police had.  In these circumstances, it cannot 
be said that the arrest was not based on 
reasonable and probable grounds…”  We are 
not persuaded that the trial judge erred in her 
findings of fact and we agree with her 
conclusion. [references omitted, paras. 14-15] 
 
The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the 
accused’s sentence was reduced to 18 months. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
SAME SEX SAFETY SEARCH 
REASONABLE: OPPOSITE 
GENDER NOT REQUIRED 
R. v. Sepulveda, 2005 BCPC 0236 
 
The accused was arrested on 
outstanding warrants for drug 
trafficking and failing to 
appear. A male police officer 
began to search the accused for weapons, in 
either her jacket pockets or around her 
waistband. She pulled away, demanded that a 
female officer search her and prevented the 
search by flailing and screaming. A second male 
officer assisted in controlling the accused and a 
search around her waistband was completed. 
During the struggle to search her, the accused 
spat in the second officer’s face.  
 
The accused was charged with assaulting a police 
officer in the lawful execution of his duty under 
s.270 of the Criminal Code. At trial in British 
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Columbia Provincial Court the accused argued 
that the officer was not in the lawful execution 
of his duty because the strip search undertaken 
in these circumstances did not comply with the 
rules enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679. Since 
the search was unreasonable, the accused 
submitted, it amounted to an assault upon her 
which she was legally entitled to repel. The 
Crown, on the other hand, countered that the 
search was not a strip search, but rather a 
“frisk” or “pat down” search which was justified 
and reasonably performed.  
 
A “strip search” was defined by the Supreme 
Court of Canada as “the removal or 
rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a 
person so as to permit a visual inspection of a 
person's private areas, namely genitals, 
buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or 
undergarments.” Strip searches, as British 
Columbia Provincial Court Justice A. Rounthwaite 
noted, are intrusive, significantly interfere with 
personal privacy, and are potentially humiliating, 
embarrassing, or degrading and require a higher 
burden of justification than a quick pat or frisk 
search. In this case, Justice Rounthwaite found 
the search was a cursory or pat down search, not 
a strip search as advanced by the accused. She 
stated: 
 
It is clear from all the evidence that this 
search lacked any of the humiliating or 
embarrassing aspects of strip searches. The 
search was not significant enough for the 
independent civilian witness…to mention it in 
his account of the interaction between [the 
accused] and the officers. There is no 
evidence that [the accused’s] genital areas or 
undergarments were exposed to anyone’s view. 
Her clothes were neither removed, nor 
rearranged to permit visual inspection of her 
private areas. The waistband of her pants was 
simply patted and lifted out in a search for 
weapons. Such a search must be characterised 
as a cursory frisk or pat down rather than a 
strip search.  
 
This search had a valid objective. The officers 
had ample grounds to believe [the accused] 
might be carrying a needle or a weapon: the 
area in which she was arrested was known for 
drug trafficking, she was known to [the 
officer] as a trafficker, and he had arrested 
many females in possession of weapons. In 
fact, when the female officer arrived she 
found a knife and an unsheathed razor blade in 
[the accused’s] jacket pocket. [The accused] 
was also carrying a crack pipe. 
 
The search was also carried out reasonably. 
The officers’ use of force was necessitated by 
[the accused’s] struggles to avoid being 
frisked. [The civilian witness] described the 
police as calm, trying to do their job and 
diffuse the situation, while [the accused] was 
loud, twisting and kicking, hostile and 
combative. The officers restricted the search 
to the area of her clothing [the accused] could 
reach while handcuffed and did not search her 
private areas. Although she may have wished 
or thought she should only be searched by a 
female officer, that is not the law. A frisk or 
pat down search of a detainee for weapons 
performed by an officer of the opposite sex 
does not constitute an unreasonable search. 
[The accused’s] personal reason for not 
wanting to be searched by a man may be 
relevant to sentence, but it does not make the 
search unreasonable nor provide a defence. 
 
For these reasons, I find [the officer] 
conducted a cursory frisk or pat down search 
of [the accused], a search for weapons 
incidental to her arrest that involved a minimal 
invasion of her privacy and personal integrity. 
It was not a strip search subject to the limits 
imposed in Golden v. the Queen. [paras.  8-11] 
 
Thus, the officer was acting in the lawful 
execution of his duty when he searched the 
accused and she was convicted of assaulting a 
peace officer.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
The nice thing about teamwork is that you always 
have others on your side—Margaret Carty 
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DISMISSED TICKET DOES NOT 
NEGATE OBSTRUCTION 
CHARGE 
R. v. Lord, 2005 BCCA 165 
 
A railway police officer was 
monitoring a stop sign and 
observed the accused fail to 
come to a stop. He pulled the 
accused over and asked for his 
driver’s licence and registration. Some 
documents were provided and the accused exited 
his vehicle. The officer asked the accused to 
either get back in his vehicle or move to the 
side, off the traveled portion of the road, while 
he examined the documents and prepared a 
ticket.  
 
The accused was very agitated, called the 
officer “fucking pig” and “asshole”, and told the 
officer he had no jurisdiction to deal with him 
nor any right to require him to get back in his 
vehicle or move off the road. The accused 
ignored the officer’s direction and he was 
charged with and convicted of obstructing a 
peace officer in the execution of his duty under 
s.129(a) of the Criminal Code in British Columbia 
Provincial Court. 
 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia4 arguing that he did not have to 
follow the officer’s directions. Justice Baker 
affirmed the verdict of the Provincial Court. In 
her view, the accused was obstructing the police 
officer when he refused to comply with the 
officer’s direction. She stated: 
 
In those circumstances, with the officer being 
unable to convince [the accused] to follow his 
direction to get back into his vehicle or to go 
to the side of the road, the officer had a 
reasonable perception that if he returned to 
his own vehicle while [the accused] remained 
on the roadway, [the accused] would be posing 
a risk to himself and possibly to other 
motorists who might come by on the roadway 
                                                 
4 See R. v. Lord, 2004 BCSC 1794 for details of the offence. 
and might either veer to avoid him or be 
startled by him.  I conclude it is also 
reasonable that in his assessment of the risk 
that [the accused] was creating a hazard, the 
officer was entitled to take into account the 
fact that [the accused] was very agitated and 
was behaving in an unusual fashion by using 
insulting and derogatory language to the peace 
officer. [para. 7] 
 
In addressing the three elements required for a 
successful obstruction charge 1) an obstruction, 
2) the obstruction affected the officer in the 
execution of his duty, and 3) the accused 
obstructed willfully, Justice Baker held: 
 
In this case, the learned trial judge referred 
to s. 123 of the Motor Vehicle Act, which 
provides that if a peace officer reasonably 
considers it necessary to prevent injury or 
damage to persons or property, he may direct 
traffic, and that includes pedestrian traffic, 
according to his or her discretion, and 
everyone must obey his or her direction. 
 
I have already said that the peace officer, in 
my view, could reasonably consider it 
necessary to have [the accused] leave his 
position on the roadway in order to prevent 
injury or damage to persons or property, and 
he did give that direction and it was mandatory 
for [the accused] to comply.  Clearly, [the 
accused] did not comply.  The officer’s 
concerns about [the accused’s] safety and that 
of other persons prevented the officer from 
carrying out his intended duties of returning 
to his vehicle to deal with the information he 
had obtained and the preparing of a citation, 
and accordingly, the second element is made 
out. 
 
The final element is whether or not [the 
accused] was shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
to have been obstructing the officer wilfully.  
In my view, the learned trial judge had 
evidence on which he could reach that 
conclusion, given [the accused’s] evidence at 
trial and the evidence of the police officer as 
to [the accused’s] statements and behaviour, 
and his adamant refusal after attempts at 
coaxing him to remove himself from the 
roadway. [paras. 23-25] 
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The accused then sought leave to appeal before 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, 
among other grounds, that the dismissal of the 
traffic ticket issued to him for not stopping 
(apparently because the officer did not attend 
the traffic court hearing) demonstrated that 
the officer had no basis to stop him, direct him 
to move, or charge him with obstruction when he 
didn’t move. In dismissing leave to appeal, 
Justice Saunders, in chambers, stated: 
 
This new fact, that the traffic ticket was 
dismissed, would not alter the result, in my 
view…. The issue before the trial judge was 
whether [the accused] had wilfully obstructed 
a police officer in the execution of his duty.  
This required a consideration of the wilfulness 
of [the accused’s] actions, the question 
whether his actions amounted to obstruction 
and the question whether the police officer 
was acting in the execution of his duty.  The 
fact that the traffic ticket was dismissed 
does not negate the conclusion that the 
officer, in stopping [the accused], was acting in 
the execution of his duty, or more importantly 
for this case, that his attempt to have [the 
accused] move was not in the execution of his 
duty: s. 123, Motor Vehicle Act. [references 
omitted, para. 12] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
KNOCK & NOTICE RULE 
VIOLATED BUT EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Vukelic, 2005 BCPC 0156 
 
The police obtained a search 
warrant to search the accused’s 
residence. The warrant was 
executed by an Emergency 
Response Team (ERT) smashing 
down the front door without first making 
announcement. Inside, police found the accused 
and his girlfriend and 385 growing marihuana 
plants. During a voir dire in British Columbia 
Provincial Court, the accused argued, in part, 
that the search was unreasonable under s.8 of 
the Charter and that the evidence should be 
excluded because of the way police carried the 
search out without announcement.  
 
Justice Chen agreed that the police violated the 
common law requirement of the “knock/notice” 
rule when they smashed down the door. However, 
in his view the evidence should not be excluded. 
The police action was not dictated by policy 
which deliberately ignored the common law 
requirements. Rather, ERT was used because 
police had received information that there were 
or could be firearms in the residence, which was 
a reasonable belief. Justice Chen stated: 
 
I find that the presence of firearms in such a 
context as a marihuana grow operation does 
present a potential danger to police conducting 
a search and that the police are not 
unreasonable in taking measures to address 
such a potential danger. [para. 38] 
 
Since the police were acting in the interests of 
their safety given the circumstances of the 
case, the seriousness of the Charter breach in 
not announcing was reduced and the exclusion of 
the conscriptive evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute more 
than by admitting it. The accused’s application to 
exclude the evidence was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
HUNCH NOT ENOUGH FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
R. v. Peardon, 2005 BCPC 0117 
 
The accused was stopped by 
police on the Trans Canada 
Highway. The police concluded he 
might be impaired because he 
was driving 15 km/h below the 
speed limit, had his window rolled down partway, 
and was traveling along the fog line. The vehicle 
was a rental car and the officer noticed fast-
food wrappers, coffee cups, a cell phone and 
personal luggage. The accused was the sole 
occupant and appeared nervous. The officer 
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quickly realized the accused was not impaired, 
but was suspicious that he might be hauling 
contraband.  
 
The officer conducted a computer check and 
learned the accused had no warrants, but had a 
criminal record that included a marihuana 
cultivation conviction and a firearms prohibition. 
As a result of the officer’s observation, training, 
and experience, he decided to continue with an 
investigative detention under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act. The accused was 
asked to exit his vehicle, advised he was being 
detained, handcuffed, and read his rights to a 
lawyer. He said he wanted to talk to a lawyer, 
but was not given the opportunity at that time.  
 
A drug sniffing police dog was deployed to 
search the vehicle, but instead sat near the 
right leg of the accused. The accused was then 
arrested and searched and a large number of 
$20 bills were found, but no drugs. The dog 
moved to the vehicle where he sat at the back of 
the trunk. The trunk was opened and a smell of 
fresh marihuana was detected. A substantial 
amount of marihuana was subsequently seized 
and the accused was charged with possession of 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused submitted he had been 
arbitrarily detained, subject to an unreasonable 
search and seizure, had his right to counsel 
breached and that the evidence should have 
been excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. In 
determining whether the accused’s Charter 
rights had been violated, Justice Overend first 
examined the police power to detain for 
investigative purposes.  
 
An investigative detention will be justified at 
common law if an officer has reasonable grounds 
to detain (or articulable cause). This requires “a 
constellation of objectively discernible facts 
which gives the detaining officer reasonable 
cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally 
implicated in the activity under investigation.” In 
finding the officer did not have the necessary 
grounds to detain the accused, Justice Overend 
stated: 
 
In this case, approximately eleven minutes after 
concluding that the accused could not be detained 
based on the officer's initial suspicion that he 
might be an impaired driver, his informal 
detention was continued until 10:30, when he was 
formally detained under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. The reasonable grounds offered 
by the officer were the presence in the vehicle of 
food wrappers, coffee cups, a cellphone and 
personal luggage. Additionally, the accused was 
very nervous, had a conviction of unspecified date 
for cultivation of marihuana, and was subject to a 
firearms prohibition. These objectively 
discernible facts do not give rise to reasonable 
grounds to suspect criminal activity under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The facts 
do not point to the commission of a particular 
crime…, and I underline the wor[d] particular. It 
was conceded by the officer that the presence in 
the vehicle of the items mentioned was common 
among persons not involved in criminal activity, 
and had it not been conceded, I would have taken 
judicial notice of that fact. [para. 16] 
 
And further  
 
Subjectively, the police officer, based in part 
on his training and experience, suspected that 
the accused might be involved in transporting 
contraband. Training and experience, however, 
does not provide the reasonable grounds for a 
subjective belief or suspicion. Objectively 
speaking, this was nothing more than a hunch, 
largely based on the officer's experience 
dealing with investigations of drug offences. 
In order to determine whether objectively 
speaking the police officer had reasonable 
grounds for his suspicion, it is necessary to ask 
whether a reasonable person, apprised of the 
facts known to [the officer], would have had a 
suspicion that the accused was in possession of 
contraband, contrary to the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act.  
 
The answer must clearly be no. While a 
suspicion may have arisen as to the reason for 
the nervousness of the accused, it is much 
more than a reasonable leap to conclude that 
the nervousness is connected to an offence 
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under that Act. All that differentiates the 
reaction of the police officer to these facts, 
and the reaction of anyone else, was his 
experience. Based on that experience, he 
acted on a hunch that the accused might be in 
possession of contraband. I am satisfied that 
the detention was not only unlawful but also 
arbitrary. [para. 18-19] 
 
Other problems the Court had with the 
detention included its length (21 minutes before 
the arrest), its manner (handcuffed for 10 
minutes on the side of the highway), and its 
purpose (to discover evidence to justify a 
hunch). 
 
As for the search, it was warrantless and 
therefore presumed to be unreasonable unless it 
could be justified under statute or common law 
(incidental to arrest or investigative detention). 
Since the detention was arbitrary and unlawful, 
there was no lawful right to search the accused. 
The search was therefore unreasonable under 
s.8 of the Charter. However, had Justice 
Overend found the detention lawful, he would 
have had no problem with the sniff searches. He 
stated: 
 
A warrantless search is prima facie, but not 
conclusively, unreasonable. The Charter is 
designed to protect legitimate privacy 
interests. [The police dog’s] search in this 
case revealed, and could only reveal, the 
presence of illicit drugs on the person of the 
accused. No other personal information 
about the accused was revealed to the police 
officer when the dog sat by [the accused’s] 
leg. Citizens do not have a legitimate privacy 
interest in the possession of contraband 
drugs. While there was some evidence that a 
sniffing dog can be wrong, the evidence in 
this case did not lead me to the conclusion 
that this dog was wrong. [para. 29] 
 
The accused’s s.10(b) Charter right was also 
breached: 
 
In this case, I have found breaches of the 
[accused’s] Charter of Rights with respect to 
the investigative detention and the search. 
Because it was an arbitrary and unlawful 
detention, there was no lawful right to search. 
Finally, the accused was not afforded an 
opportunity to consult with counsel as required 
by Section 10(b). This is significant as, at best, 
it shows an insensitivity by the police to the 
importance of the rights of the accused under 
the Charter. The police officer did not provide 
access to counsel because they did not intend 
to question the accused before he had had an 
opportunity to speak to a lawyer. Without 
delay means without delay, given all the 
circumstances of the detention or arrest, 
including the necessity to secure a crime 
scene, preserve evidence, and ensure the 
safety of the police officer, the accused and 
members of the public, if any.  
 
It also must take into consideration the 
availability of a phone or other means of 
communication with counsel. None of those 
factors would have prevented prompt access in 
this case. Phone access could have been made 
available within minutes of the defendant 
being stopped. The police were able to make 
phone contact with Crown counsel from the 
side of the highway. That could have been 
made available to [the accused]. It was 
approaching two hours before he got his phone 
call, despite his having requested immediate 
access. [para. 34-35] 
 
In light of all the Charter violations the evidence 
was excluded. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
ARBITRARY:  
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED 
R. v. Schuhknecht, 2005 BCPC 0161 
 
Two members of a city wide 
enforcement team—a team set 
up to monitor Vancouver’s 
downtown east side and deter 
crime—entered a high crime hotel as part of a 
routine walk through. In the first floor hallway 
they saw the accused pushing a bicycle and 
carrying a large backpack. Upon seeing the 
 16            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 4 
  July/August 2005 
officers, the accused lowered his head and 
looked away to avoid eye contact. He was 
ordered several times to stop but ignored the 
commands and continued walking towards the 
officers, passing by them. The officers followed 
him and he eventually stopped by the exit door. 
He was asked his name and date of birth several 
times but refused to answer. Reluctantly, he 
provided the information and a computer check 
revealed he was on probation—not to possess 
tools outside his residence or any instrument 
capable of breaking into motor vehicles.  
 
When asked if he had any tools the accused 
reached into his pocket and placed a knife with a 
flat end on the ground. He was arrested for 
breach of probation, searched, and read his 
Charter rights. During a voir dire in British 
Columbia Provincial Court the arresting officer 
testified the existence of the probation order 
provided him with the legal right to search the 
accused to ensure he was complying with its 
terms.   
 
The accused argued that his rights were violated 
because: 
 
• he was arbitrarily detained when he was 
ordered to stop and that the police did not 
have a reasonable suspicion he was involved in 
criminal activity;  
 
• he was not told why he was detained and was 
not advised of his right to counsel, both 
Charter violations under s.10; and  
 
• the production of the knife was in response 
to the officer’s questions and amounted to an 
unreasonable search under s.8.  
 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued the 
following: 
 
• the police had not detained the accused until 
he was questioned about the tools. Up until 
that point, the officers were establishing his 
identity;  
 
• the police had articulable cause to detain the 
accused because of his suspicious behaviour, 
the high crime area, and the fact the accused 
was on probation;  
 
• the production of the knife was not related 
to the s.10 breaches and had not been 
obtained from a search, but was voluntarily 
produced which then provided reasonable 
grounds for the arrest; and 
 
• the evidence should be admitted under 
s.24(2) because the detention was short, the 
accused’s rights were minimally interfered 
with, the evidence was non-conscriptive, and 
the officers acted in good faith. 
 
Detention 
 
In determining whether the accused’s rights had 
been breached, Justice Bruce first concluded 
that the accused had been detained. She stated: 
 
The common law authority of a peace officer 
to detain persons for investigative purposes 
is based, fundamentally, upon a reasonable 
suspicion that the person sought to be 
detained is implicated in some criminal 
activity under investigation… 
 
Thus where a person is detained other than 
in connection with the investigation of a 
criminal offence, there can be no articulable 
cause for the detention and it is thus 
necessarily arbitrary.  
 
In the case at hand, the officers were not 
investigating the commission of a criminal 
offence, either ongoing or recent. They 
stopped the accused because he was a 
suspicious person in a hotel associated with a 
high crime rate. His detention was thus 
arbitrary and contrary to Section 9 of the 
Charter…[references omitted, paras. 23-25] 
 
And further: 
 
In this case the evidence supports a 
conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, 
that both the officers and the accused 
believed he was detained. First, [the officer] 
testified that the accused was not free to 
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leave and would have been stopped if he had 
tried to walk away. Second, although the 
accused was very reluctant to answer [the 
officer’s] demands that he provide his name 
and birth date, he remained in the hallway and 
did not try to leave. This is particularly 
significant because it was apparent to the 
officers from the outset that the accused had 
not stopped willingly. Indeed, at first he 
ignored their commands and walked passed 
them. In my view the accused’s actions in this 
regard evidence a belief that he would not be 
permitted to leave. Finally, the accused was 
accosted in the hallway of a hotel by two 
uniformed officers. The stop was not on a 
public street where the accused could have 
easily walked away from the police or ignored 
their inquiries. [para. 28] 
 
Since there was a detention, the accused was 
entitled to be advised of its reason (s.10(a) 
Charter) and of the right to counsel (s.10(b) 
Charter), but was denied these rights. As noted, 
the detention was arbitrary and the knife would 
not have not been found but for the unlawful 
detention. Hence, the subsequent arrest and 
search incidental thereto violated s.8 and s.9 of 
the Charter. 
 
Admissibility 
 
In determining whether the evidence should be 
admitted under s.24(2), Justice Bruce 
considered a number of factors including the 
good faith of the police. In this case she found 
the officers were not acting in good faith: 
 
Moreover, it cannot be said that the officers 
were acting in good faith. Their actions 
demonstrated a woefully inadequate 
understanding of the law in regard to the 
accused’s rights under the Charter. I accept 
that the officers did not have the benefit of 
the Mann decision, which was issued after the 
accused’s detention on July 31, 2004; however, 
the Supreme Court only clarified the law 
concerning the power to search incidental to 
an investigative detention. The grounds for a 
lawful investigative detention were well 
settled at the time and there is no excuse for 
the officers’ failure to appreciate the need 
for a constellation of objectively discernable 
facts implicating the accused in a particular 
offence.  
 
In my view the officers acted in complete 
disregard for the rights of the accused and, in 
particular, his right not to be arbitrarily 
detained. As members of the City wide 
enforcement team the officers had a clear 
duty to protect law abiding members of the 
down town east side community from criminal 
activity in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, 
the police cannot be so intent upon 
accomplishing this objective that they fail to 
accord the proper respect for an individual’s 
right to liberty. [references omitted, paras. 
37-38] 
 
The evidence was excluded. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
KNOWINGLY CONDUCTING 
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AMOUNTS 
TO BAD FAITH  
R. v. Nguyen, 2005 BCPC 0226 
 
A police officer suspected a drug 
transaction involving a van and 
stopped it. The accused was told 
to get out, advised he was being 
detained for investigation of trafficking in a 
controlled substance, and given his right to 
counsel and the police warning. The officer did 
not believe he had reasonable grounds to arrest 
the accused nor to believe a crime had been 
committed. He then searched the accused and 
his van for weapons and evidence of crime. The 
police found cash and a cell phone on the accused 
and cocaine in his van.  
 
During the voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court, the officer testified he knew that his 
search for evidence was prohibited by the 
Charter. The Crown conceded the searches 
violated the accused’s s.8 Charter right 
protecting him against unreasonable search and 
seizure, but argued the evidence should be 
admitted under s.24(2).  
 18            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 4 
  July/August 2005 
In determining whether the evidence should be 
admitted, Justice Saunderson examined whether 
the officer acted in good or bad faith. In 
concluding that the officer acted in bad faith, 
Justice Saunderson stated.  
 
My findings and decision are therefore as 
follows. [The officer] had reasonable grounds 
to detain the defendant. [The officer] was 
justified in conducting a pat-down search for 
weapons(counsel did not argue the point, and 
the police officer was, after all, dealing with a 
suspected drug dealer). There is no factual 
basis in evidence from which I can conclude it 
was reasonable for [the officer] to proceed 
beyond the pat-down search for officer safety 
purposes. Indeed, the constable himself said 
that he was looking for evidence of drug 
trafficking. The search of the [accused’s] 
person and of his van, in respect of both of 
which there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, was not justified on the facts of this 
case, as conceded by Crown counsel. That 
there were objectively reasonable and 
probable grounds for [the officer] to believe 
the defendant had just trafficked in drugs, 
such as to, for example, justify his arrest, 
cannot assist the Crown where the subjective 
belief did not exist, nor can it logically affect 
the issue of good faith when assessing 
whether the evidence ought to be admitted or 
excluded. 
 
Knowing that his searches for evidence 
violated the highest law of the land, and 
proceeding with the searches in spite of that 
knowledge, amounted to bad faith on his part. 
……… 
This was no trifling breach of the Charter. It 
goes right to the heart of the rule of law. For 
the police to be able to knowingly break the 
law to obtain evidence, secure in the knowledge 
that it can be used in court, is not likely to 
find favour with reasonable Canadians who are 
reasonably well informed. To admit the 
product of these searches in evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute…[paras. 19-22] 
 
The evidence was excluded. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
POLICE NOT REQUIRED TO 
READ DETAINEE’s MIND 
R. v. Atkinson, 2005 BCPC 241 
 
After a silent alarm was 
sounded at a ski shop, a police 
officer set up a roadblock to 
check all vehicles leaving the 
mountain. Shortly after, the 
accused pulled up to the roadblock and as a 
result of his observations and conversation—
smell of liquor, fumbling to retrieve driver’s 
licence, red, watery and glassy eyes, slurred 
speech, a slow and tilted walk, and an admission 
of consuming a beer—the officer formed 
reasonable and probable grounds to make a 
breath demand. After being read his right to a 
lawyer, the accused said “I would like to contact 
a lawyer,” but did not ask or specify that he 
wished to contact any particular lawyer. 
 
When the officer arrived at the police station 
he placed a call to legal aid and the accused had 
a four minute conversation with counsel. After 
he was finished, the officer asked the accused, 
“Are you satisfied with your call to a lawyer”, to 
which the accused responded, “Yes, I am.” Two 
breath samples of 180mg% were subsequently 
obtained.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused argued that his right under 
s.10(b) of the Charter had been violated because 
he was not asked if he had a specific lawyer in 
mind to call thereby denying him of his right to 
call the lawyer of his choice. Rather, in the 
accused’s opinion, a call was placed to legal aid 
without further consultation with him and a 
judicial stay of proceedings or exclusion of the 
breathalyzer certificate was an appropriate 
remedy.  
 
Justice Moss rejected the accused’s submission. 
In the judge’s view there was no Charter breach: 
 
[W]e have the officer directly asking the 
detainee after the phone call to Legal Aid of 
some four minutes duration whether or not he 
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was satisfied with his discussion "with the 
lawyer". [The accused] responded "Yes". In my 
view, the officer can place reliance upon this 
assertion by [the accused]. It is not for the 
officer to read the accused’s mind. The 
Charter of Rights informational component was 
appropriately provided to the accused. In 
order to effectively implement the Charter of 
Rights informational component there is an 
onus upon the accused to express a desire to 
speak to a lawyer of his choice other than 
Legal Aid Duty Counsel if that is the case. 
[The accused] did not at any time say he 
wished to contact any particular lawyer. Unless 
he says something about so doing versus 
discussing the matter with freely available 
Legal Aid Duty Counsel 24 hours a day, he 
cannot later claim that his rights to counsel of 
his choice were somehow abridged or short-
circuited as a result of the officer, in good 
faith, placing a phone call on his behalf to the 
Legal Aid Duty Counsel.  
 
It is trite law to say a detainee must exercise 
reasonable diligence in exercising the 
implementation portion of his Charter right to 
counsel of his choice. I find the standard 
police recitation of section 10(b) Charter 
rights by [the officer] was clear and 
unequivocal. The accused confirmed he 
understood his rights to counsel of his choice 
or free 24-hour Legal Aid Duty Counsel legal 
advice. He did not provide any indication 
whatsoever of a desire to access a phone book 
or complain about any inability to call the 
lawyer of his choice nor did he turn down the 
telephone call to Legal Aid. To the contrary, he 
talked some four minutes to the Legal Aid 
Duty Counsel, and afterwards expressed 
satisfaction with the contents of that call and 
proceeded thereafter to provide the sought-
for-breath samples.  
 
On the evidence, I find [the accused] was not 
foreclosed of his legal rights to counsel of his 
choice. If the police, by default, place a call to 
Legal Aid Duty Counsel for a detainee in 
circumstances such as existed here, it can 
hardly be said they somehow violated his 
Charter 10(b) rights to counsel of his choice. 
He was not deprived of a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right to counsel of 
his choice. He never exerted it!... [references 
omitted, paras. 8-10] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
POTENTIALLY INNOCUOUS 
OBJECT MAY BE DANGEROUS: 
PROTECTIVE SEARCH OK  
R. v. Tran, 2005 BCPC 255 
 
Two police officers were flagged 
down by a woman and told that 
there were two men doing drugs 
in the lane behind her home. The 
officers drove into the lane and saw two men 
squatting on a private driveway and leaning 
against a concrete wall beside the gate to the 
underground parking lot. They each had a crack 
pipe in their hands. They didn’t answer when 
asked what was going on, but the accused gave 
his name and birth date without identification. 
An officer asked the accused if he had any 
needles, knives or anything sharp—things people 
in the officer’s area commonly carry.  
 
The officer conducted a cursory pat down 
search for weapons, needles or knives and felt a 
small object under the accused’s jacket pocket 
seam. When asked twice what it was, the 
accused did not answer. Concerned that the 
object could be an exacto knife blade, razor 
blade or needles in a container, the officer 
reached into the accused’s pocket and removed a 
plastic vial containing four rocks of cocaine. The 
accused was arrested, handcuffed and searched 
further. Tweezers, exacto knife blades, push 
sticks, screw drivers and other crack pipes were 
found.  
 
The accused brought an application to the 
British Columbia Provincial Court to exclude the 
cocaine because his rights against arbitrary 
detention (s.9 Charter) and unreasonable search 
(s.8 Charter) had been breached. Justice A. 
Rounthwaite, however, disagreed.  
 
The police can detain a person for investigative 
detention if, in all of the circumstances, there 
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are reasonable grounds to suspect the person is 
connected to a particular crime and the 
detention is necessary. In this case, the accused 
was with another man at the location reported 
and had a crack pipe in his possession. The 
officer also subjectively had the necessary 
suspicion for the detention. Justice Rounthwaite 
concluded that “a brief detention for questioning 
was necessary for the officers to investigate 
the recent offence reported to them.” The 
detention was not arbitrary and therefore s.9 of 
the Charter was not violated. 
 
As for the search, police officers are entitled to 
conduct a protective pat down search of a 
detained person if there are reasonable grounds 
to believe their or others’ safety is at risk. 
Here, the search was reasonable and was not a 
breach of the accused’s s.8 Charter rights: 
 
[The officer] believed on reasonable grounds 
that her safety and that of her partner was at 
risk. [The accused] was in a lane in the 
downtown eastside, holding a crack pipe. When 
asked if he had needles, knives or anything 
sharp he did not reply. It is common for people 
in that district to carry such items. The 
officer had not had time to check CPIC for 
[the accused’s] history. The evidence 
establishes both subjective and objective 
grounds for concern about officer safety. As a 
result, [the officer] was entitled to conduct a 
cursory pat down search for weapons, needles 
or knives that could harm her or her partner 
during the investigative detention. 
 
On feeling a solid object in the lining of [the 
accused’s] jacket, [the officer] asked twice 
what it was and got no response. Thinking it 
could be an exacto knife blade, razor blade, or 
needles in a container, she removed the object 
and examined it. When she did this she still 
believed that officer safety was at risk. The 
evidence establishes her belief was 
reasonable. The fact that the object might 
have been innocuous does not affect the fact 
that it might also have been dangerous. [paras. 
8-9] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
ABSENT DETENTION NO 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
R. v. Thomas, 2005 QCCA 628 
 
The accused walked into a 
police station in Jamaica and 
confessed to murdering a 
person in Canada. He told two 
Jamaican police officers that 
he had to tell someone about the murder 
because it was haunting him and he was having 
nightmares and flashbacks. At first, the 
Jamaican officers thought the accused was 
insane, but changed their minds since he spoke 
fluently, intelligibly and provided a coherent 
statement. The accused was not offered the 
opportunity to speak with a lawyer but was 
advised of his right to remain silent.  
 
After his oral confession, the police took a 
complete confession from the accused in the 
form of a written statement and he signed it. 
After the confession the accused was arrested 
and detained. He was returned to Canada and 
was charged with the murder. During a voir dire 
in Quebec Superior Court the trial judge found 
the confession admissible because it was 
obtained in accordance with Jamaican law. The 
Jamaican police officers were not acting on 
behalf of Canada and were therefore not bound 
by the Charter. Furthermore, it was freely and 
voluntarily given and was the product of an 
operating mind. Even though the accused felt 
compelled to make the statement, the compulsion 
did not result from the actions of the 
authorities but rather was self induced.  
 
He was convicted by a jury of first degree 
murder in Quebec Superior Court, but appealed 
to the Quebec Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that his statement was made without being 
offered or afforded the opportunity to contact 
counsel. 
 
Justice Doydon, writing the unanimous Quebec 
Court of Appeal judgment ruled that even if this 
statement had been taken in Canada there would 
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have been no Charter breach. Since the accused 
was not detained when the confession was 
obtained, s.10(b) of the Charter would not apply. 
Jamaican law aside, even under Canadian law the 
statement was validly obtained and was 
admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
POLICE NOT OBLIGED TO 
ADVISE ARRESTEE OF 
DEFENCES 
R. v. Norman, 2004 NBCA 33 
 
The accused was arrested after 
he turned himself into police 
following the sexual assault of a 
15 year old girl he had driven to 
a secluded and wooded area. He had consulted 
with a lawyer and told police he was not allowed 
to give a statement, even though he wanted to. 
The following morning the accused was taken to 
a hospital because he was complaining of chest 
pains; he suffered an anxiety attack. Later that 
day, he agreed to a police interview and was 
again advised of his right to counsel and told a 
legal aid lawyer was available. He was also given 
the police warning about his right to silence and 
that his statement might be used against him. 
The accused agreed to a videotaped interview 
and admitted to taking the girl hostage and 
sexually assaulting her.  
 
The accused was charged with sexual assault and 
forcible confinement. During a voir dire in the 
New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench, the trial 
judge ruled the statement admissible. The 
accused then brought an appeal before the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
grounds, that he mistakenly believed he 
committed “statutory rape”, to which consent is 
not a defence, and therefore did not make an 
informed statement to police. In rejecting this 
ground of appeal, Justice Richard, authoring the 
unanimous appeal court judgment, agreed with 
the trial judge when the trial judge said: 
In my opinion, the argument of counsel for the 
accused with respect to the age of consent 
issue is without merit. The duty of the police 
when conducting an interview of an accused is 
to ensure that the accused has been advised 
of his or her right to counsel and has been 
issued the standard police warning and 
secondary caution and then to conduct the 
interview in a professional, non-oppressive 
manner without inducement, trickery or deceit. 
 
In my opinion, it should not be the obligation 
of the police to advise an accused of any 
available defences or legal issues relating to 
the crime being investigated. In my view, those 
legal issues are the responsibility of the 
lawyer contacted by the accused. [para 18] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org. 
 
2006 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 10-12, 2006  
 
Mark your calendar! The 
British Columbia Association 
of Chief's of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia will be 
hosting the "Police Leadership 2006 
Conference" April 10 to 12, 2006 at the Westin 
Bayshore in Vancouver, British Columbia. This is 
Canada’s largest Police Leadership Conference 
and was sold out in 2004.  
 
This conference will emphasize leadership as an 
activity, not a position, and provide an 
opportunity for participants of all ranks from 
police agencies across Canada, the United 
States, and beyond to engage  with a carefully 
chosen list of first class speakers. For more 
information, visit the JIBC Police Academy 
website at: 
 
www.jibc.bc.ca 
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DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that Statistics Canada recently released its 
2004 crime statistics for Canada’s 27 Census 
Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). The top 10 in each 
category are:  
 
2004 CMA Top Ten Homicide Rates 
(per 100,000 residents) 
Regina 5.0 
Winnipeg 4.9 
Abbotsford 4.4 
Edmonton 3.4 
Saskatoon 3.3 
Vancouver 2.6 
Halifax 2.4 
Calgary 1.9 
Toronto 1.8 
Montreal 1.7 
Canada 1.9 
 
 
2004 CMA Top Ten Motor Vehicle Theft Rates (per 
100,000 residents) 
Winnipeg 1,932 
Abbotsford 1,529 
Regina 1,351 
Vancouver 1,104 
Edmonton 1,018 
Montreal 663 
London 611 
Saskatoon 590 
Hamilton 540 
Halifax 540 
Canada 531 
 
 
 
 
2004 CMA Top Ten Break-in Rates  
(per 100,000 residents) 
Regina 2,112 
Saskatoon 1,797 
Abbotsford 1,390 
Vancouver 1,325 
St. John’s 1,149 
Edmonton 1,129 
Winnipeg 1,124 
Halifax 957 
Victoria 935 
Gatineau 928 
Canada 860 
 
2004 CMA Top Ten Robbery Rates  
(per 100,000 residents) 
Winnipeg 229 
Regina 211 
Saskatoon 209 
Halifax 161 
Montreal 150 
Vancouver 148 
Edmonton 141 
Toronto  103 
Abbotsford 97 
Calgary 91 
Canada 86 
 
For a complete copy of Statistic’s Canada report, 
see The Daily, Thursday July 21, 2005, available 
online at www.statcan.ca 
 
PRIVATE ARREST NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE CHARTER 
R. v. Skier, 2005 NSCA 86 
 
The accused was arrested by a 
private security guard for theft 
after wheeling a shopping cart 
out of a store in the company of 
a woman without paying for the items it 
contained. The guard advised the accused about 
his right to a lawyer, but it was inadequate 
because it did not inform of access to duty 
counsel. He then made an incriminating 
statement to the guard and was turned over to 
the police.  
 
During a voir dire in Nova Scotia Provincial Court 
the trial judge concluded that the security guard 
was not subject to the Charter. The statement, 
2004 CMA Top Ten Crime Rates  
(per 100,000 residents) 
Regina 15,430 
Saskatoon 13,767 
Abbotsford 13,252 
Winnipeg 12,167 
Vancouver 11,814 
Edmonton 11,332 
Victoria 10,309 
Halifax 9,924 
Thunder Bay 9,226 
Montreal 8,173 
Canada 8,051 
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which proved the accused knew there had been 
no payment for the goods, was admitted. He was 
convicted of theft under $5,000 and breach of 
probation, for failing to keep the peace and be 
of good behaviour. He then appealed directly to 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in ruling that s.10(b) 
of the Charter was not triggered by an arrest 
under s.494 of the Criminal Code. 
 
Justice Fichaud first examined the application 
of the Charter. He noted that the Charter will 
apply to persons in two ways: 
 
• activities of the government, whether or not 
they can be classified as private, or 
 
• a private entity implementing a specific 
government policy or program or a private 
individual acting as an agent of the state or 
the police. 
 
The accused submitted that the security guard 
was implementing a governmental policy in the 
field of criminal law when he was arrested under 
s.494 of the Criminal Code and was handed over 
to the police. Justice Fichaud, however, rejected 
this argument for the unanimous appeal court. In 
his view, the security guard did not act as a 
state or police agent. Nor did s.494 expressly 
delegate or abandon the police arrest function. 
Unlike the implementation of specific 
governmental policy which would engage the 
Charter, mere action for a public purpose, as in 
this case, does not. The arrest by the security 
guard was not subject to the Charter and the 
appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Even the casual observer to this contest could not 
fail to note the profound irony of [the accused], 
having violated the privacy of Mr. Hodge in the 
most egregious fashion [by a break-in], now seeking 
Charter relief from this Court on the basis of 
police entry into a hotel room he has rented in the 
name of Mr. Hodge by the use of the credit card 
that he took from the home of Mr. Hodge—Justice 
Gage (R. v. Millar, 2005 ONCJ 61) 
GENERALIZED ASSERTIONS 
TO SEAL WARRANT NOT 
ENOUGH 
Ontario v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. 
et al, 2005 SCC 41 
 
Six search warrants were 
issued to the Ministry of 
Natural Resources under the 
Ontario Provincial Offences 
Act for violations related to the slaughter of 
cattle. The investigation garnered widespread 
media coverage and the police commenced a 
fraud investigation into the business of the meat 
packing operation involved. The Crown brought an 
exparte application before the Ontario Court of 
Justice requesting the search warrants, the 
information to obtain, and related documents be 
sealed. The Crown claimed public disclosure of 
materials could identify a confidential informant 
and interfere with the ongoing criminal 
investigation.  
 
The warrants, informations, and affidavit in 
support of the application were ordered sealed 
for three months, but the Toronto Star 
Newspapers Ltd. and other media outlets were 
successful in having the sealing order quashed in 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The 
Justice ordered the documents public except 
for any contents that could identify the 
confidential informant.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, but was unsuccessful. Justice Doherty 
concluded that the Crown had not displaced the 
presumption that judicial proceedings are open 
and public. He did, however, recognize that the 
materials had to be edited to protect the 
confidential informant. The Crown appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which determined 
the test for delaying public access to search 
warrant materials.  
 
Justice Fish, writing the unanimous Supreme 
Court of Canada judgment, first noted that 
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“once a search warrant is executed, the warrant 
and information upon which it is issued must be 
made available to the public unless an applicant 
seeking a sealing order can demonstrate that 
public access would subvert the ends of justice.” 
Before a search warrant is executed, this 
presumption of openness is rebutted. After 
execution of the warrant, however, openness is 
presumptively favoured, including openness in 
the pre-charge, investigative, or pre-trial stages 
of judicial proceedings. The onus then shifts to 
the party seeking to deny public access to prove 
disclosure would subvert the ends of justice.  
 
The grounds required to seal warrant materials 
“must not just be asserted in the abstract; it 
must be supported by particularized grounds 
related to the investigation that is said to be 
imperiled.” Generalized assertions that publicity 
could compromise investigative efficacy is not 
enough. The test, however, must be flexible and 
a contextual one. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
NO PRIVACY IN 
FRAUDULENTLY RENTED 
HOTEL ROOM 
R. v. Millar, 2005 ONCJ 61 
 
The accused broke into a home 
and stole a wallet with 
identification and credit cards 
as well as the victim’s car keys 
and car. The victim’s VISA card was used at 3 
am to rent a hotel room and to pay for an escort 
agency. VISA security alerted the victim and 
police attended the hotel. Police found the 
victim’s car in the hotel parking lot and learned 
from the front desk that room 211 was rented in 
the victim’s name.  
 
The police were given an access card to room 211 
and they unlocked and opened the door but the 
security latch engaged. The police then knocked 
and the occupant disengaged the security latch. 
The accused was then arrested and searched. In 
his pocket the police located the keys to the 
victim’s vehicle. While searching the room police 
found the victim’s wallet, identification, and 
credit cards under the mattress and the hotel 
VISA receipt in the garbage can.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused argued the police violated his s.8 
Charter right when they entered his hotel room, 
arrested him, and searched. In noting “the 
profound irony” in the accused seeking Charter 
relief on the basis of police entry into a room 
rented with a credit card taken from the 
victim’s home where the victim’s privacy was 
violated in the most egregious manner, Justice 
Gage ruled that the accused had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy which would trigger s.8 
Charter protection.   
 
In this case it is my view that the [accused] 
has not demonstrated a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Room 211…at the 
relevant time. He was present at the time of 
the search, he was in possession of the room 
and he had the ability to regulate access by 
means of the security latch. He was neither 
the owner nor a legitimate lessee of the space. 
Moreover he had obtained possession and 
control of the room under false pretences and 
he had tendered fraudulent payment for the 
rental of the space. Since he did not give 
evidence we do not know what his subjective 
expectation was. In this case his subjective 
expectation would have had limited impact 
since it is my view that viewed from an 
objective perspective he could not have held 
any reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed 
the only reasonable expectation that he could 
have had in the circumstances was that his 
fraud and impersonation would be discovered 
and that he would be summarily removed from 
the room and that is in fact what occurred. I 
therefore find that his section 8 rights were 
not breached. [para. 21] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
